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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE H. MORGAN, BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs-
BARBARA A. MORGAN, EVA S. BARNEY Case No. 920846 
and VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; each of the 
above-named defendants personally, Priority No. 16 
if living, the unknown spouse, heirs, 
devisees, assignees, personal representatives, 
and all creditors of each of the deceased 
defendants; also all other persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, estate, interest 
or lien upon the real property described in 
Complaint adverse to plaintiff's ownership or 
clouding plaintiff's title thereto, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Plaintiff/appellee, Dale H. Morgan, submits the following as 
his brief of appellee in the above-entitled action: 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, §78-2-2(3)(j), and Rule 3a, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Further, this appeal has properly been 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah, in conformity with Rule 42 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, District Court Judge presiding, 
entitled "Summary Judgment and Order," signed and entered in the 
trial court on or about May 1, 1992. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There is no statutory nor case law authority believed by 
appellee to be wholly dispositive of the issues raised in this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
!• Plaintiff and defendant were formerly husband and wife, 
having been divorced in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 1979, 
in a separate action. Pursuant to the decree of divorce entered 
between these parties, various dispositions were made regarding, 
among other things, the parties' assets. The parties' assets 
included two parcels of real property, a residence in Salt Lake 
County (hereinafter "home") and in a summer home in Summit County 
(hereinafter "summer home.") In the decree of divorce, the 
parties were also ordered to pay various costs and expenses 
associated with these two properties, including mortgages and 
costs of maintenance. 
2. Appellee/plaintiff, Dale H. Morgan, commenced this 
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action against Barbara A. Morgan, her mother, Eva S. Barney, and 
Valley Bank & Trust Company, by filing a complaint on November 6, 
1986. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that defendant, 
Barbara A. Morgan, had defrauded him into deeding to her his 
title interest in the two real properties. He claimed that he 
still held an equitable interest in the two properties. (R.O.A., 
3, 4). 
3. Plaintiff also alleged in his complaint that defendant, 
Eva S. Barney, acquired an interest in the home (but not in the 
summer home) by reason of a lien granted to her by her co-
defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, which was recorded against the 
title of the home on May 27, 1986. (R.O.A., 4, 5). 
4. Plaintiff filed this action to quiet title in his 
undivided one-half interest in the home and the summer home, 
which he had been granted in the decree of divorce. Defendant 
gave notice of this action to all interested parties through 
service of process by publication, as is appropriate in a quiet 
title action. (R.O.A., 11, 12, 13 and 14). 
5. This action was ultimately consolidated with the 
divorce action. (R.O.A., 26, 27). 
6. Defendants, filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint. This motion was denied below pursuant to an order of 
December 29, 1986. (R.O.A., 29). 
7. It is critical to note that in her answer to 
plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 5, defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, 
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admitted that the plaintiff had granted to her a quit-claim deed 
to the summer home, and that this was recorded with the Summit 
County Recorder "in due season." (R.O.A., 35), Thus, as of the 
date of her answer, on or about January 15, 1987, defendant, 
Barbara A. Morgan held sole legal title to the summer home. 
8# Defendants took no further action of any kind 
whatsoever to pursue this case during 1987 and the first four 
months of 1988, and the case was ordered dismissed, for failure 
to prosecute the action, on April 18, 1988. (R.O.A., 41). 
Defendants objected to that order of dismissal. (R.O.A., 42). 
The court allowed this objection, and granted defendant leave to 
file a counter-claim. (R.O.A., 49). She filed a counterclaim on 
August 19, 1988. (R.O.A., 50). 
9. Plaintiff moved the court to dismiss the action for 
failure to prosecute on September 27, 1991, approximately three 
years after the filing of the defendant's counterclaim. (R.O.A., 
59). 
10. The court's response to this motion to dismiss for 
failure to prosecute was to set a scheduling conference on 
December 5, 1991. (R.O.A., 65). The case was set for trial for 
April 13, 1992, (R.O.A., 84). 
11. On February 11, 1992, plaintiff submitted requests for 
admissions to the defendant. Specifically, plaintiff asked the 
defendant to admit that the attachments to the requests for 
admissions were the only verification defendant had of her 
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claimed entitlement to $49,000,00. These requests for admissions 
were properly served upon defendant's counsel by mailing on 
February 10, 1992, The thirty-day time limit in which the 
opportunity to respond to the requests for admissions expired on 
March 15, 1992. Thereafter, the requests for admissions were 
deemed admitted. Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
12. In the meantime, Pine Meadow Ranch Owners' Association, 
(hereinafter the "homeowner's association") commenced a lawsuit 
against plaintiff, Dale H, Morgan, by filing a complaint in the 
"Fifth Circuit Court, Park City Department, in and for Summit 
County, State of Utah" on June 10, 1986, alleging that Dale H. 
Morgan was indebted to the homeowner's association in the sum of 
$4,246.47, for assessments on the summer home. (R.O.A., 157)• 
13. Dale H. Morgan answered that separate Circuit Court 
complaint of the homeowner's association. (R.O.A., 159). 
14. On December 5, 1986, the homeowner's association filed 
an amended complaint, naming Barbara A. Morgan as a defendant in 
the Circuit Court lawsuit. (R.O.A., 178, 179). As noted above, 
Barbara A. Morgan, had received a quit-claim deed from Dale H. 
Morgan and had, by then, recorded it, making her the sole record 
title holder of the summer home. 
15. Barbara A. Morgan was served with a summons in the 
Circuit Court action. A return of service upon her was duly 
filed with the court on December 22, 1986. (R.O.A., 180, 181). 
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16. Barbara A. Morgan failed to respond to the complaint, 
and default was entered against her by the Circuit Court on 
January 14, 1987. (R.O.A., 182). 
17. The homeowner's association obtained a default judgment 
against Barbara A. Morgan, alone, on January 14, 1987. This 
judgment was in the sum of $4,975.27, together with interest from 
October 31, 1986, attorney's fees of $1,500.00, and court costs 
Of $210.75. (R.O.A., 186, 187). 
18. On June 5, 1987, Pine Meadow Ranch Owners' Association 
obtained a writ of execution from the Circuit Court to execute 
upon Barbara A. Morgan's real property. (R.O.A., 188, 189). The 
total judgment against Barbara A. Morgan which the homeowner's 
association sought to satisfy by the writ of execution was in the 
sura of $7,073.03. 
19. On August 3, 1987, the Summit County Sheriff conducted 
a sale of the summer home. The homeowner's association purchased 
the property for the sum of $6,000.00, leaving a balance due on 
its judgment of $1,073.03. (R.O.A., 190, 191). A notice was 
filed with the Circuit Court that, as of August 3, 1987, the 
property was subject to a six month redemption. (R.O.A., 191). 
20. On or about March 1, 1988, a Sheriff's deed from the 
Summit County Sheriff to the homeowner's association was recorded 
with the Summit County Recorder's Office. (R.O.A., 200, 201). 
It should be noted that this deed from the Sheriff to Pine Meadow 
Ranch Owners' Association was not recorded until the six month 
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redemption period had passed. Thereafter, on May 5, 1988, a 
special warranty deed from homeowner's association, to Dale H. 
Morgan was recorded with the Summit County Recorder's Office. 
The title to the summer home passed to Dale H. Morgan from the 
homeowner's association approximately seven and one-half months 
after the Sheriff's execution sale. 
21. On March 9, 1992, plaintiff filed his motion for 
summary judgment and supporting memorandum in this action. 
(R.O.A., 130). Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiff's motion on March 18, 1992. (R.O.A., 135). Plaintiff 
filed his reply memorandum on March 20, 1992. 
22. The depositions of both parties were before the court 
at the time the trial court considered the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff's deposition had 
been taken by defendant's counsel on December 2, 1988. The 
defendant's deposition had been taken on November 30, 1989. 
(R.O.A., 239, 317). 
23. After submission of the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment for decision on March 24, 1992, (R.O.A., 148) the 
defendant filed a "Supplemental Affidavit of Defendant, Barbara 
A. Morgan." This was filed on March 27, 1992, (R.O.A., 151). 
24. In her affidavit to the court of March 27, 1992, 
defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, admits that there is a return of 
service in the Circuit Court lawsuit, indicating that she had 
been served with process in that Circuit Court action. (R.O.A., 
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152), She states that she does not remember being served with 
the Circuit Court summons. 
25. The court below issued a minute entry granting 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on April 7, 1992. 
(R.O.A., 204). Barbara A. Morgan filed objections to the 
plaintiff's proposed summary judgment and order on April 21, 
1992, and plaintiff filed a response to those objections on April 
28, 1992. (R.O.A., 213). Thereafter, on May 1, 1992, the trial 
court signed and entered the plaintiff's proposed summary 
judgment and order, thus overruling the defendant's objection to 
the proposed order. (R.O.A., 216). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The summary judgment appealed from is a final judgment, 
and therefore, this appeal is not premature. However, if this 
court should find that the summary judgment is not a final order, 
and that this appeal is premature, then the entire appeal should 
be dismissed, without a decision on the merits, and the case 
should be remanded to the trial court for entry of a final 
judgment. 
2. The parties to this action were not co-tenants of the 
summer home at the time the Circuit Court lawsuit was commenced. 
Therefore, the actions of plaintiff in buying the summer home 
cannot inure to the benefit of the defendant. The summer home 
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was not redeemed from the Sheriff's sale, and therefore, there is 
no redemption to inure to the benefit of these parties, even if 
the parties were co-tenants. 
3. There are no facts before the trial court, nor before 
this court, to establish "collusion" between the plaintiff here 
and the homeowner's association. Because there is no factual 
dispute as to this issue, then there is no factual issue to be 
determined by the trial court. 
4. The Circuit Court properly issued a judgment against 
defendant here, Barbara A. Morgan. The court issued a writ of 
execution, and the Summit County Sheriff conducted an execution 
sale upon the summer home on August 6, 1987. No one redeemed the 
property within six months after that execution sale, and the 
Summit County Sheriff issued a deed to the homeowner's 
association. The homeowner's association thereafter deeded the 
property to Dale H* Morgan, weeks after the six-month redemption 
period had passed. Barbara A. Morgan irrevocably lost any 
interest she had in the summer home as a result of the execution 
sale. These circumstances establish a basis to quiet title in 
the summer home in the plaintiff, as a matter of law. 
5. Defendant's claims against the plaintiff under the 
decree of divorce for arrearages in mortgage payments, real 
property taxes, real property insurance, the costs of maintenance 
and repair to the residence, and child support arrearages, 
allegedly totalling $49,590.00, were clearly subject to dismissal 
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pursuant to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The 
lower court had before it the defendant's deposition in which she 
was unable to establish or document any of the alleged claims 
totalling $49,590.00. Defendant failed to answer, the requests 
for admissions, in which she admitted that she had no further 
verification of her claimed expenses, except those few attached 
to th§ requests for admissions. These requests for admissions 
were deemed admitted as a matter of law. Most importantly, the 
defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, filed absolutely no affidavit in 
support of her claim for $49,590.00, and in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment until the time to do so had passed. 
The court was entitled to enter the summary judgment against the 
defendant, as a matter of law, for the following reasons: 
^. The defendant's repeated failure to pursue her 
counterclaim, through the court's own dismissal order and 
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, over a period of over 
five years; and 
b. The defendant's own deposition testimony to the effect 
that she was unable to document any of her expenses claimed; 
§tnd 
C The defendant's failure to respond timely with an 
affidavit or other sworn statement in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment; and 
d. The defendant's admissions, pursuant to the plaintiff's 
requests for admissions; and 
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e. The fact that the plaintiff, in his summary judgment 
motion, relinquished any claim he had against the home in 
Salt Lake County, the only property remaining as the subject 
of the litigation below, in which he claimed one-half 
interest. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM 
IS A FINAL JUDGMENT, AND THIS 
APPEAL IS NOT PREMATURE. 
Appellant alleges in her brief that the summary judgment 
appealed from is not a final order, and is not properly the 
subject of this appeal* 
As set forth in paragraph 25, above, the lower court first 
received defendant's objection to the proposed order on the 
motion for summary judgment, then received plaintiff's response 
to that objection, and then issued the order, which is the 
subject of this appeal* Clearly, this action on the part of the 
trial court constitutes a denial of the defendant's objection to 
the proposed order. Therefore, this appeal is from a final 
order. 
If this court should determine that the appeal is not from a 
final order, then the appellant's entire appeal is improper- The 
appeal should then be dismissed, as untimely, and the matter 
should be remanded to the District Court for entry of a final 
judgment, without any determination on the merits of this case. 
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If this appeal is dismissed, then plaintiff should be 
awarded his attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this appeal, 
which defendant filed, knowing it to be premature and not from a 
final j udgment. 
2. APPELLANT INCORRECTLY APPLIES THE 
DOCTRINE OF COTENANCY TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE, 
In point 2 of her argument, defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, 
relies heavily upon the doctrine of cotenancy to assert that the 
trial court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that defendant 
could no longer assert a claim on the summer home. Defendant 
misapplies the law of the state of Utah with regard to this 
doctrine, to the facts of the instant case. 
Defendant cites the case of McCready v. Fredericksenf 126 P. 
316 (1912), in support of her claim. The McCready case has no 
application to the facts in the instant case. McCready deals 
with the question of whether or not a cotenant can make a claim 
to quiet title against a cotenant, based upon the doctrine of 
adverse possession. The Utah Supreme Court, in the McCready 
decision, upheld the proposition that the action of one tenant to 
preserve an interest in real property would be deemed the action 
of all cotenants in the property. 
Defendant also cites, in favor of her position on appeal, 
the case of Sweeney Land Company v. Kimball. 786 P.2d, 760 (Ut. 
1990). Again, the Sweeney case deals with the issue of whether 
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or not one cotenant to real property can assert a claim for 
adverse possession of the property against another cotenant. 
Again, in Sweeney, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the proposition 
that an action of one tenant to preserve property would inure to 
the benefit of all cotenants. 
This case law cited by defendant has no application to the 
instant lawsuit whatsoever. In this case, no one has ever made a 
claim against any other party for adverse possession, which is 
the underlying legal theory addressed in both McCready and 
Sweeney. In the case at bar, plaintiff originally filed his 
complaint alleging defendant had obtained the legal title to two 
parcels of real property by fraud. He alleged defendant and 
plaintiff had each been awarded a one-half interest in their real 
property in their divorce, and that defendant subsequently 
misrepresented to plaintiff that she had a buyer for the 
property. She induced plaintiff to give her a quit-claim deed to 
both properties in order to enable her to close the sales. There 
was no buyer, but defendant nonetheless recorded the quit-claim 
deeds to the property, thus placing all legal title in both 
parcels in her own name. Plaintiff commenced this action to 
establish that the quit-claim deeds had been obtained on the 
basis of fraud, and that he still held an interest in the home 
and the summer home which had been awarded to him in the decree 
of divorce. He was forced to commence that action as a quiet 
title action, because of the interests of other parties, 
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including a first lien mortgage holder, the defendant's mother as 
a second lien mortgage holder, the homeowner's association, etc. 
Plaintiff has never claimed that he was entitled to the summer 
home or to the home by reason of the doctrine of adverse 
possession. 
Subsequently, the homeowner's association brought suit 
regarding homeowner's fees due for the summer home. Despite the 
fact that defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, held all record title to 
the summer home, the homeowner's association nonetheless sued the 
wrong person. The homeowner's association sued the plaintiff 
here, Mr. Morgan, who no longer held any record title interest in 
the property due to the conduct of the defendant. 
The homeowner's association obviously recognized its error 
when it amended its Circuit Court complaint to include Barbara A. 
Morgan as a defendant in that lawsuit. According to the Circuit 
Court records, defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, was served as a 
defendant in the Circuit Court action, and her default was 
entered, as set forth in the Statement of Facts, above. The 
homeowner's association then proceeded to execute upon the summer 
home, the legal title to which was held solely and exclusively in 
the name of Barbara A. Morgan. She failed to defend the lawsuit 
against her, she failed to take any action to defend the property 
which was then solely and exclusively in her name, and after the 
property was lost in the execution sale, she failed to redeem the 
property for a period in excess of six months. 
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Plaintiff, Mr. Morgan, acguired his new interest in the 
summer home by purchasing it from the homeowner's association 
after all right, title and interest of Barbara A. Morgan in that 
property had been extinguished as a matter of law. 
The parties to this action were simply not cotenants of the 
summer home under any stretch of the imagination. Barbara A. 
Morgan held sole and exclusive title to that real estate when the 
homeowner's association sued for its fees. Barbara A. Morgan, 
through her own inaction, lost all title to the property to the 
homeowner's association. Because the homeowner's association 
obtained proper legal title to the summer home, during the 
pendency of the action between these parties in the District 
Court, any claim of these tow parties to the summer home 
addressed in this District Court lawsuit, was extinguished. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, these two litigants were not 
cotenants of the property in issue at any time relevant to these 
proceedings. Defendant lost the title to the property due to her 
failure to answer a lawsuit, to pay a judgment, or to redeem the 
property after the execution sale. 
Plaintiff, Mr. Morgan who purchased this property 
independently from the homeowner's association long after the 
execution sale, should be treated here as would any independent 
third-party purchaser of the property. He acguired all the 
interest of the homeowner's association by his independent 
purchase, free of any claim on the part of the defendant. The 
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plaintiff's subsequent purchase of the property long after the 
fact did not somehow suddenly regenerate a cotenancy in the 
property which had been extinguished years before by the 
defendant's filing of a quit-claim deed she had received, 
allegedly by fraud, from the plaintiff. 
Defendant incorrectly asserts that the rights of these 
parties in the summer home arise out of their prior marital 
relationship. This may have been true at one time. However, the 
chain of events with regard to this property after that marital 
relationship was severed have thoroughly erased any right the 
defendant may have to the summer home by reason of the marital 
relationship. This chain of events includes the decree of 
divorce, the subsequent quit-claim deed of the summer home by 
plaintiff here to defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, the subsequent 
lawsuit against Barbara A. Morgan by the homeowner's association, 
the judgment obtained by the homeowner's association against 
Barbara A. Morgan, which attached as a lien to the property, the 
execution sale of the property, the failure to redeem after the 
execution sale, and the subsequent purchase for new consideration 
by Dale H. Morgan. The marital relationship of these parties is 
so remote in time and so remote in this chain of events, that it 
gives no basis to the defendant to claim an equitable interest in 
the plaintiff's summer home. 
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3. THERE IS NO FACTUAL ISSUE AS TO 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF AND THE 
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION WERE "IN 
COLLUSION." 
The defendant attempts to raise a red herring, alleging that 
plaintiff and the homeowner's association were somehow in 
collusion, and that as a result of such alleged collusion, 
plaintiff should be deemed to hold the summer home in a fiduciary 
capacity for the benefit of both parties to this action. 
In the defendant's point 3 of her brief, she raises a number 
of objections to the proceedings in the Circuit Court* She 
alleges a number of procedural irregularities in the Circuit 
Court. It should be noted that defendant has never made any 
effort whatsoever in that case since she was served with process 
in the Circuit Court action on November 14, 1986. In other 
words, during a period of approximately six years and two months, 
defendant has never answered that complaint against her, nor 
moved the court for relief from the default judgment against her, 
nor objected to the personal or subject matter jurisdiction of 
the Circuit Court, nor moved the court to stay the execution 
sale, nor filed bankruptcy to stay the execution sale, nor 
attempted to redeem the property from the execution sale. Though 
defendant herein has known about the Circuit Court action and 
judgment since at least early 1992, when her own attorney in this 
case began to make reference to that judgment and action, she 
still has failed to take any independent action objecting to the 
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Circuit Court proceedings. 
This appeal is not the proper forum to object to the Circuit 
Court matter. The Circuit Court itself, and then the appropriate 
appellate court, would be the proper forum in which to address 
any alleged any procedural irregularities in the Circuit Court 
case. The defendant cannot collaterally attack the Circuit Court 
order here. On the face of that court file, the defendant was 
properly sued, properly served, properly defaulted and properly 
executed upon. If she wishes to attack those proceedings, she 
must do so in the Circuit Court in order to give the Circuit 
Court an opportunity to correct its own error, and an order to 
give a very interested party, the homeowner's association, an 
opportunity to respond to those attacks. 
All of the defendant's "indications of collusion" cited in 
point 3 of her appeal brief, seem to be predicated on one 
underlying assumption: that the plaintiff here, Dale H. Morgan, 
had a duty to answer and defend the lawsuit from the homeowner's 
association, to protect the interests of Barbara A. Morgan, but 
that Barbara A. Morgan had no similar duty to answer the lawsuit 
when she was served, nor to defend that lawsuit to protect 
herself. Simply put, defendant claims that plaintiff here is 
somehow at fault for eventually giving up on that lawsuit and 
failing to incur the expenses to defend it, while defendant here 
is not similarly at fault. Neither party to this action had any 
legal duty to the other party to defend a lawsuit, when both 
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parties had notice of that lawsuit, and an opportunity to appear 
and defend. 
Defendant alleges that it is a "indication of collusion" 
that she was supposedly told by Dale H. Morgan that the Circuit 
Court lawsuit was "groundless." Defendant seems to argue in her 
brief that plaintiff had some fiduciary obligation to put her on 
notice that his interests were adverse to her own. Such a claim 
is ludicrous. Plaintiff and defendant had sued each other and 
been divorced from each other in 1979. Plaintiff had 
subsequently filed the lawsuit which is the subject of this 
appeal, claiming, among other things, that defendant had 
committed fraud with regard to the titles to the real property. 
It is absurd to suggest, under this set of facts, that defendant 
still believed, when served with the homeowner's association 
lawsuit, that Dale H. Morgan was acting in her best interests, or 
taking care of her property rights. Plaintiff owed no fiduciary 
obligation to the defendant under the circumstances, and 
defendant had an obligation to protect her own property. 
Defendant seems to allege that there was some procedural 
irregularity about the fact that no judgment was ever entered 
against Dale H. Morgan in the Circuit Court proceeding. The 
answer to this mystery is simple. Mr Morgan never permitted 
himself to be defaulted. Further, defendant forgets her own 
position asserted in the trial court below, that Dale H. Morgan 
had previously deeded to her all interest in the summer home, and 
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that she had recorded the deed, thus granting her sole legal 
title to the property. If she was the sole legal titleholder of 
the summer home, then she was the only person against whom the 
homeowner's association needed to proceed to get what they wanted 
- - payment of their fees or possession of the home located 
within their homeowner's association. Arguably, plaintiff here 
and defendant, Barbara A. Morgan, were jointly and severally 
liable for any homeowner's association fees incurred while they 
were joint owners of the summer home. Thereafter, Barbara A. 
Morgan became solely obligated for any expenses incurred in 
connection with the summer home she claims she owned. Defendant 
here defaulted in that lawsuit, and the homeowner's association 
properly obtained its judgment against her. Thereafter, the 
homeowner's association executed upon the property which was held 
solely and exclusively at that point in time by Barbara A. 
Morgan. Therefore, the homeowner's association did not need to 
waste time or expenses pursuing Dale H. Morgan further, nor did 
the homeowner's association need to obtain a judgment against him 
to get what it wanted. Further, the homeowner's association took 
the interest of Barbara A. Morgan only, in the summer home. The 
property was still subject to Mr. Morgan's lis pendens arising 
out of this lawsuit, so he was protected. There is nothing 
peculiar about the actions of either the homeowner's association 
or the Dale H. Morgan in this scenario. In fact, the homeowner's 
association did exactly what one would expect such a creditor to 
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do under such circumstances. 
Defendant asserts, without any evidence on the record to 
support her assertion, that the summer home had a value of 
$165,000.00. There is no basis in the record for such a claim, 
and there was no evidence before the trial court, nor is there 
any evidence before this court, of the true valuation of that 
property. 
Defendant can establish no evidence for the alleged 
"laundering procedure" between plaintiff here and the homeowner's 
association, other than her misguided analysis of the Circuit 
Court lawsuit. There is simply no factual basis to suppose any 
collusion between plaintiff, Mr. Morgan, and the homeowner's 
association. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Morgan and the 
homeowner's association did in fact collude to "launder" the 
title to the summer home, and simultaneously to pay the fees 
owing to the homeowner's association, then defendant cannot 
describe one reason why such action on the part of the plaintiff 
was illegal or improper. As noted above, plaintiff here owed no 
fiduciary obligation to the defendant at any time relevant to 
these proceedings. Defendant was an adult represented by legal 
counsel, who knew full well that the plaintiff's interests were 
seriously adverse to her own because she had been sued by him in 
an action seeking to obtain title to real estate she held solely 
in her own name. If this court assumes, for the sake of 
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argument, that Mr. Morgan and the homeowner's association did in 
fact collude, there is no reason why such collusion cannot result 
in the title to the property lawfully being held by plaintiff, 
and the defendant losing all right to claim an interest in that 
property. 
4. BECAUSE OF THE EXECUTION SALE OF 
THE SUMMER HOME, THE TRIAL COURT 
BELOW PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED, AND 
THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE 
SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE LEGAL TITLE TO 
THE SUMMER HOME. 
As noted above, plaintiff purchased the summer home from the 
homeowner's association over seven months after the execution 
sale. He never owed any fiduciary obligation to the defendant. 
The execution sale and subseguent purchase of the summer home by 
plaintiff severed any claim defendant had to the summer home as a 
matter of law. Therefore, the trial court acted properly in 
granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, and awarding him sole 
legal title interest in that property. 
Again, in point 4 of her brief, defendant alleges that there 
is an issue of collusion between the homeowner's association and 
plaintiff in the Circuit Court action. As noted above, there is 
no basis to suppose collusion from the facts of this case. Even 
if collusion is assumed, this is not a reason to grant defendant 
any legal or equitable interest in the summer home. 
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Also, in point 4 of her brief, the defendant attacks alleged 
procedural irregularities in the Circuit Court proceeding. As 
noted above, this appeal is not the proper forum for that attack. 
Defendant should attack the Circuit Court action in the Circuit 
Court itself, and if unsuccessful there, should appeal from that 
decision. This case is not the proper forum to attack the 
Circuit Court decision, when the homeowner's association is not a 
party to this action to defend itself, and when the defendant has 
acquiesced to the Circuit Court proceedings by defaulting, and by 
failing to petition the court to set aside her default. 
5. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR ARREARAGES IN 
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS, BACK TAXES, REAL 
PROPERTY INSURANCE, REPAIRS TO THE 
RESIDENCE AND CHILD SUPPORT 
ARREARAGES WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT PURSUANT TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Defendant asserts a counterclaim against plaintiff for 
approximately $49,590.00. Defendant alleges in her counterclaim 
that plaintiff owes her this money under the decree of divorce 
entered between these parties for trust deed payments she made to 
Valley Bank, arrearages on real property taxes for both the 
summer home and the home, arrears for insurance, for repairs 
which defendant paid, and arrearages in child support. 
The court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to 
dismiss this counterclaim. This action on the part of the trial 
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court is proper. 
A. DEFENDANT RAISED NO FACTUAL BASIS 
TO OBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As noted in the statement of facts, set forth above, 
plaintiff filed his summary judgment motion below on March 9, 
1992. Defendant responded by a memorandum in opposition on March 
18, 1992. Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum on March 20, 1992. 
At this point in time, the opportunity for the parties to file 
affidavits in support of or in opposition to the summary judgment 
motion ended. At this point in time, the opportunity for the 
parties to file memoranda in support of their respective 
positions also terminated. Defendant did not file any affidavit 
in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
until her "supplemental affidavit" filed March 27, 1992. 
(R.O.A., 151). This filing occurred only after the court had 
indicated it had taken the matter under advisement and would rule 
on the motion. (See minute entry of March 26, 1992, R.O.A., 
150) . 
The defendant simply failed to file any timely affidavit in 
opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment until long 
after the time period for her to do so had elapsed. Therefore, 
the trial court did not commit any error in granting the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT HAD BEFORE IT A 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR GRANTING THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
At the time the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment, the trial court had before it the 
deposition of the plaintiff, the deposition of the defendant, and 
the plaintiff's request for admissions which were deemed admitted 
by the defendant as a matter of law. Pursuant to the testimony 
of the plaintiff in his deposition, the defendant in her 
depositions and the defendant's inability to deny or refute any 
of the contents of the requests for admissions, it is clear that 
the undisputed facts before the court were to the effect that the 
defendant's counterclaim should be denied. The court did not 
err, on the record, in granting the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment* 
C. THE FACT THAT A CLAIM FOR CHILD 
SUPPORT IS INVOLVED DOES NOT CHANGE 
THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING. 
Defendant seems to assert, at page 34 of her brief, that it 
is not proper to set off a claim for a money judgment or property 
rights against a claim for child support. This allegation on the 
part of the defendant is wholly without authority. It is 
apparently defendant's position that if plaintiff and defendant 
owe each other money, the court cannot set-off these claims, one 
against the other, if one claim is for child support and the 
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other is for a property settlement. This is simply not the 
status of the law, and defendant can cite no authority for this 
proposition. 
6. THERE IS AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING. 
Defendant's argument wholly ignores an independent basis for 
the trial court's determination to grant plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. 
This lawsuit was commenced on November 6, 1986. Defendant 
did the bare minimum required to avoid being defaulted upon that 
complaint, by filing a motion to dismiss, and when that motion 
was denied, by filing an answer. As noted in the Statement of 
Facts above, the case then sat for a period of fourteen months 
from the date of her answer on January 15, 1987, until the 
court's own order to show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute the action, which was filed 
March 30, 1988. (R.O.A., 40). The court actually dismissed the 
case, and the case lay dormant and dismissed from the April 15, 
1988 order of dismissal (R.O.A., 41), until the defendant filed a 
"Motion to Rescind Order of Dismissal" approximately three months 
later on July 5, 1988. (R.O.A., 42). 
The trial court indulged the defendant by granting her 
motion to rescind the dismissal, and granting her leave to file 
her counterclaim, which she did in fact file on August 19, 1988. 
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(R.O.A., 50). Plaintiff responded to that counterclaim, and 
there was a brief flurry of activity from defendant while the 
plaintiff was deposed on November 2, 1988. 
This lawsuit lay dormant again, including the defendant's 
counterclaim against the plaintiff, from the date of the 
defendant's deposition on November 30, 1989, until plaintiff 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute almost two 
years later on September 27, 1991. Defendant did not timely 
respond by objecting to this motion, and on October 11, 1991, 
plaintiff submitted this motion to the court pursuant to a notice 
to submit and request for ruling. (R.O.A., 62). Only after the 
motion had been pending for over one month did the defendant file 
a certification of readiness for trial on October 16, 1991. 
(R.O.A., 64). When defendant filed her certification of 
readiness for trial, she had not complied with discovery requests 
which had been made to her in the course of her deposition on 
November 30, 1989. (See plaintiff's objection to certification 
of readiness for trial, R.O.A., 70; see also plaintiff's motion 
to compel discovery filed October 30, 1991, R.O.A., 76). 
The plaintiff then filed his motion for summary judgment. 
The motion for summary judgment was, in effect, merely a 
reiteration of his motion to dismiss the case for failure of the 
defendant to prosecute her counterclaim. In his motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff asked the court to dismiss his 
claim against the defendant, to dismiss the defendant's claim 
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against the plaintiff, to leave the legal titles to two 
properties as reflected by the County Recorder's Offices, and to 
leave each party to assume his or her own court costs and 
attorney's fees. Plaintiff asked for nothing in his motion for 
summary judgment which would not also be the result of the court 
granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute• 
The trial court never ruled specifically upon the 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, but 
instead granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
Given the defendant's dilatory pursuit of her counterclaim 
for a period spanning five years, the trial court was well within 
its rights to dismiss the parties' causes of action for failure 
to prosecute, and the trial court accomplished exactly this by 
granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
An independent legal basis to support the court's ruling in 
this matter exists on the record, and even if the court should 
not have granted a motion for summary judgment under the facts 
and circumstances of this case, the court was operating well 
within its rights to control its calendar and to dismiss stale 
litigation for failure of the parties to prosecute their actions. 
For this independent reason, the judgment and order of the trial 
court should be affirmed, as harmless error. 
(The court should also consider the defendant's actions in 
the case now before the court, when assessing her claim that she 
was not really served with the Circuit Court lawsuit, and that 
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her failure to take any action in the Circuit Court lawsuit was 
caused solely by her lack of notice of that proceeding. Her 
conduct in this litigation indicates otherwise.) 
7. THE COURT MUST CONSIDER THE TRIAL 
COURT ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
AN ORDER CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE 
PARTS. 
The summary judgment and order entered by the trial court on 
or about May 1, 1992, is an order which actually consists of 
multiple parts. This court can and should consider each part of 
that summary judgment separately. Even if this court determines 
to reverse the trial court as to some portion of the summary 
judgment and order, this court can and should still affirm 
portions of the summary judgment and order. 
Paragraph 3, of the summary judgment and order contains an 
order that each party shall continue as the sole legal title 
holder of the property he or she has ended up with as of the date 
of the summary judgment. In other words, plaintiff is to 
continue as the sole legal title holder to the summer home, by 
reason of his purchase of the summer home from the homeowner's 
association. The defendant is to continue as the sole legal 
title holder of the home, pursuant to the quit-claim deed she 
received from the plaintiff and had previously recorded. 
There is no basis for the defendant to object legally to the 
plaintiff's ownership of the summer home at this time, given the 
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status of title of that home. The trial court did not err in 
finding that the plaintiff holds sole and exclusive title to that 
property free and clear of any interests of the defendant, as a 
matter of law. This portion of paragraph 3 of the summary 
judgment and order should stand. 
Therefore, if this court should determine that the court 
below lacked adequate basis to dismiss plaintiff's claim against 
defendant regarding the home, and defendant's counterclaim 
against the plaintiff based upon the decree of divorce, then this 
court should reverse and remand to the trial court for trial -on 
the plaintiff's claim regarding the home, and the defendant's 
counterclaim. Even if the court does reverse the trial court's 
decision in part, in this manner, the trial court's decision 
regarding the title to the summer home should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly found, from the evidence in the 
record, that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should 
be granted with regard to the title of the summer home. The 
plaintiff is the legal titleholder of that home, as a matter of 
law. 
The trial court did not err in granting the plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim and 
defendant's counterclaim. Summary judgment on those issues was 
proper as well. 
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The order of the trial court should be affirmed in its 
entirety. 
In the alternative, that portion of paragraph 3 of the 
summary judgment and order finding that the plaintiff is the sole 
legal titleholder of the summer home should be affirmed, and the 
remaining portions of the summary judgment and order should be 
reversed and remanded for trial, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of January, 1993. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
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